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In this section, we will describe the Trojan Horse compiler construction from Ken Thompson s classic 1983 ACM Turing Award speech Reflections on Trusting Trust, which explains why you cannot trust code that you did not totally create yourself The basic principle of the paper is valid more than ever today, in the context provided by our discussions so far Thompson concluded that the ability to view source code is no guarantee of trust Inspection as a means of validation can only work if the tools used to examine code are themselves trustworthy The first action taken by Rootkit attacks, an entire class of exploits aimed at obtaining superuser privileges, is the replacement of common system commands and utilities with Trojans that prevent detection.

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It will be convenient to express (1.12) in vector form. Let Rj = [ R l i , R2jlT (received vector), Si = [ a l i ,azi]' (sent vector), and Ni = [ N l i , N2j]' (noise vector). Then Rj = Si

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Commands such as su, login, telnet, ftp, ls, ps, find, du, reboot, halt, shutdown, and so on are replaced by hacked binaries that report that they have the same size and timestamp as the original executable The most common countermeasure to detect rootkit intrusions is the deployment of a cryptographic checksum package like Tripwire, which can build a database of signatures for all system files and can periodically compare the stored signatures with the cryptographic checksum of the current file Obviously, the baseline checksums must be computed before the attack and stored securely for this validity check to hold Even so, the only recourse to cleaning a hacked system is to rebuild the system from scratch by using only data from clean backups to restore state.

Solutions such as Tripwire need both the original executable and the executable file that claims to be login or su to match its checksum against the stored and trusted value Thompson considered the case where we do not have access to the source file or possess cryptographic hashes of non-Trojan versions of the code We are only able to interact with the executable by running it on some input In this case, our only clues lie in the behavior of the Trojan program and the inputs on which it deviates from the correct code In this section, we present Thompson s Trojan for two programs, login and cc On UNIX systems, login validates a username and password combination The Trojanized login accepts an additional invalid username with a blank password, enabling back door access to the system.

Needs Determination Requirements Design Development System Testing 0 Cumulative Cost Curve (dollars) 25K 20K 15K 10K 5K 0 30 Personnel Loading 25 20 15 10 5 0 25 20 15 10 5 0 0 5 10 15 Case A 20 25 Planned 0 5 10 15 20 Planned 0 5 10 15 20 Actual 25 Planned 5 10 15 20 25

Thompson s paper describing the details of the construction of a Trojan horse compiler is available at wwwacmorg/classics/sep95/ This paper is not all academic; there is a well-known story of a hacked version of the UNIX login program that was accidentally released from Ken Thompson s development group and found its way into several external UNIX environments This Trojan version of login accepted a default magic password to give anyone in the know full access to the system Our presentation is only at the abstract level and is meant to highlight the difference in behavior between the Trojan horse compiler and a standard, correct C compiler Identifying such differences, called behavioral signatures, is a common strategy for detecting intrusions or malicious data modification Signatures enable us to distinguish the good from the bad Behavioral signatures are common weapons in the.

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